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Introduction 
 
 
This paper examines the importance that the current Convention on the Future of Europe is 
giving (or not) to the question of democratic accountability in European foreign and defence 
policy. As all European Union (EU) member states are parliamentary democracies1, and as 
there is a European Parliament (EP) which also covers CFSP (Common Foreign and Security 
Policy) and ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy2) matters, I will concentrate on 
parliamentary accountability rather than democratic accountability more widely defined. Where 
appropriate, I will also refer to the work of other transnational parliamentary bodies such as the 
North Atlantic Assembly or NAA (NATO´s Parliamentary Assembly) or the Western European 
Union (WEU) Parliamentary Assembly3. The article will consist of three sections. First, I will 
briefly put the question under study within its wider context (section 1). Then, I will examine the 
current level of parliamentary accountability in CFSP and defence matters (section 2). Finally, I 
will consider the current Convention debate and assess how much attention is being given to 
the question of accountability in foreign and defence policies (section 3).  This study basically 
argues that, once again, there is very little interest in an issue that should be considered as vital 
for the future democratic development of a European foreign and defence policy. It is important 
to note however that this paper does not cover the wider debate about how to democratise and 
make the EU more transparent and closer to its citizens. It concentrates on its Second Pillar 
because its claim is that very little if any attention is being given to this question. 
 
 
I. The wider context 
 
 
In a recent article written by Prime Minister Costas Simitis to mark the beginning of the 2003 
Greek Presidency of the Council of the European Union, the emphasis was on the fact that ´[a] 
Bigger EU Must Be More Effective and More Democratic´4. 
Among other points, the Greek premier stressed that:   
 
´[t]he composition of the Convention clearly embodies the principles of 
transparency and democratic participation - the underlying rationale being the 
need  to obtain the consent not only of member governments but also of the 
peoples of the European Union´.  
 
Thus, he concludes: ´The overall aim is to render the enlarged European Union more effective 
and more democratic´.  
 
With regard to how best achieve those objectives, it is interesting to note Greece´s clear 
preference for a federal model. To quote Simitis again: 
 
´In this context it is vital to ensure that the "Community method" is 
strengthened  and that its significance for European integration is fully 
recognized. The Community method is the decision-making process through 
which the European Union has achieved improved policy coherence, more 
transparency and better chances to debate policy ideas while taking national 
interests into account. It entails  a system of checks and balances that will 
prove invaluable to the enlarged European Union´.  
 
However, there immediately follow confederal connotations:  
 
´The relationship between the European Union and the member states should, 
of course, be clarified. The Convention has been given the mandate to 
examine the notion of "subsidiarity," under which decisions are taken at the 
most appropriate institutional level, whether local, regional, national or EU-
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wide, with the EU institutions responsible only for policies and actions that are 
best decided at EU level.  
Greece believes that there is no substitute for trust among the institutions and 
among the member states if the European Union is to function properly. A strict 
division of competences between the member states and the European Union 
through the adoption of a fixed, exhaustive list of powers, as sought by some 
Convention participants, could deprive the European Union of its ability to 
evolve and respond to new challenges´.  
 
The following necessary ingredients are needed (I leave aside at this stage whether they 
represent sufficient means): 
 
´Involving national Parliaments directly in the European Union's decision-
making procedures (…) to bring national Parliaments closer to the European 
Union's decision-making so as to enhance its democratic legitimacy´. 
 
The Greek PM however does not favour:   
 
 ´the creation of a new institution consisting of members of national 
Parliaments, as some have proposed. This could not be reconciled with the 
need to simplify the acts and procedures of the European Union and would 
upset the present institutional balance, which is based on the smooth operation 
of the "institutional triangle" composed of the Commission, the Council and the 
European Parliament´. 
  
He then discusses a number of different options that have been proposed. I do not enter here in 
this particular discussion and how Greece sees it fit to modify the EU institutional structure. Nor 
do I discuss his claim that the institutional triangle is operating smoothly, especially in foreign, 
security and defence matters. What I intend to do in this piece is to assess how much attention 
is being given to an important development in European integration in recent years: its 
militarization. But this will not be done from the traditional institutional approach. Rather, I will 
discuss this question from the democratic accountability perspective. That is to say, how much 
emphasis is being given in the Convention debate on the need to exert democratic control over 
this nascent European defence policy. As the CESDP or ESDP (Common European Security 
and Defence Policy) forms part of the CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy), that is to 
say the second pillar of the EU, it is also necessary to study this question by covering both 
foreign policy and security/defence policy. 
As Simitis himself acknowledges, it is not easy to define what is Europe´s foreign policy, let 
alone its defence one. 
 
´Until now the European Union's trade relations and development cooperation 
with third countries have been conducted on the basis of the Community 
method, while in other policy areas, such as the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy  (CFSP), member governments have played the predominant role.  
This means that in the areas of trade and aid, and in some specific 
international bodies, the 15 member states operate with a single 
representative, but in all other areas of international relations the European 
Union has lacked the benefits of a legal personality. We must remedy this 
shortcoming´.  
 
He continues:  
 
´A single voice abroad entails a single framework within the European Union. 
This does not, of course, imply an instant "communitarization" of the whole 
gamut of EU actions. It simply means leaving behind a theoretical construction 
that may have proven helpful in better defining the European Union's 
functioning, but has also become restrictive on the European Union's 
potential´.  
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He fully acknowledges that there still are a number of difficulties with a decision-making model 
that would not be based on consensus: 
 
´We should also examine the possibility of complementing this measure with a 
wider use of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV), instead of consensus, in 
reaching jointly agreed viewpoints. The merits of this move are obvious: it 
would give the CFSP the added speed, efficiency and coherence that it needs.  
On the other hand, member states may be wary of a procedure that would give 
priority to efficiency over their own national interests. We could examine ways 
of assuaging these apprehensions´.  
 
What is also important for this paper is the fact that Simitis differentiates between CFSP 
decisions that have a direct impact on military questions and those that do not. Thus, he argues: 
 
´For instance, a decision to take external action with no military implications 
could be adopted by QMV on a proposal from the Commission. Opt-out 
clauses could also be provided for specific cases. The idea hinges on the 
member states being willing and able to separate core national interests from 
areas of foreign policy where they could accept a more inclusive approach´.  
 
A first conclusion that can be drawn from the above is that the debate on how to improve EU 
decision-making in foreign, security and defence matters is raging. The second conclusion is 
that defence is seen as a special area of public policy. 
 
 
II. The current level of parliamentary accountability in CFSP/CESDP: still 
wanting 
 
 
A brief review of CFSP accountability mechanisms5 would point to the fact that the European 
Parliament possesses powers of information but no real power of control, i.e. of adequate 
control. This is not unique to the EP, as many national parliamentary mechanisms also suffer 
from democratic deficits. Traditionally, foreign policy has been regarded as an executive 
prerogative. As for defence, the situation is all the more so. Both foreign and defence policies 
often require speed, efficiency, coherence, and secrecy. Difficult choices need to be made. All 
these elements represent characteristics that do not fit well with slow and open parliamentary 
deliberations. However, this only reflects part of the reality. Indeed, this so-called ‘Realist; 
approach to foreign policy has been challenged by other, more sophisticated, analyses. Be it as 
a result of the so-called ‘Foreign Policy Analysis’ approach (which acknowledges the role of 
domestic sources of foreign policy), or because of the need to question why democratic rules 
should stop at the borders of a state (the ‘International Democratic Theory’ approach), there is 
some parliamentary accountability in practice, even if it remains extremely underdeveloped. 
The EP is only allowed to play a marginal role in the formulation, let alone, in the 
implementation of the CFSP. The Parliament in Brussels/Strasbourg does however possess 
some traditional means of control in international trade, commerce, and aid policies (mainly 
budgetary powers), even if this is not the case in foreign policy per se. Still, the EP does: 
 
- debate foreign policy matters,  
- issue declarations, reports and other rhetorical statements on international relations, 
- organise ´hearings´ of EU figures and other experts, 
- pass ´resolutions´ and ´recommendations´ on almost any international issue. 
 
But the European Council and the Council of foreign ministers decide, and the EP usually reacts 
post facto with very little chance (or hope) to modify any CFSP decision that has already been 
taken. 
The national parliaments do have more powers than the EP, and in some cases there is a 
sense of accountability especially on issues dealing with internal EU matters (the ´model´ here 
is the Danish Folketing). But in CFSP matters, again it is the national governments that have the 
final say, be it because of a traditional executive dominance or because of the existence of a 
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clear majority in Parliament. One should note that even if the individual national parliaments 
were to possess more powers, there would still be a democratic deficit at the EU level if the EP 
was not given more powers as well, because the individual need for ministers (or heads of 
state/government) to be accountable does not automatically make them collectively accountable 
to a transnational Parliament. 
As far as defence is concerned, although there has been recently progress in European 
integration in that particular policy area following the 1998 Franco-British Saint-Malo 
Declaration6, there is very little, if any, parliamentary accountability. One of the reasons is that 
so far there have only been informal Defence Ministers Council meetings are they do not 
formally exist yet. A treaty change is not necessary but to date these new meetings have not 
been formalised. There is a practical problem with such a move as the ESDP is formally part of 
the CFSP but there already are bodies within the EU Council dealing with defence exclusively 
and not all CFSP issues cover defence matters. Thus the EP has repeatedly: ´demand[ed] that 
a separate Council of Ministers for Defence (…) be created for ESDP matters´7. 
 
There is in addition very little accountability at the national level where in most cases the 
Executive retains almost absolute control, especially over issues of arms exports, intelligence or 
nuclear policy. Furthermore because of the existence of NATO, there is also a parliamentary 
assembly (NAA) dealing with Trans-atlantic security issues but one that does not possess any 
real power8. Now that the WEU has been ‘disbanded’ (except for its article 5), its Assembly has 
been re-named the Interim European Security and Defence Assembly, but its influence remains 
very limited.  
All of the above does not mean there is no democratic control at all. But it does raise important 
problems of democracy, legitimacy and accountability. As Christopher Hill correctly points out: 
 
´the problem of democracy affects the substance as well as the procedures of 
the CFSP. The voice of the people needs to be heard, and the executive made 
subject to checks and balances, by a rather more extensive and transparent 
combination of national and European parliamentary measures than is 
currently the case´9. 
 
There are definitely many democratic deficits that need to be addressed10. I now turn to the 
Convention debate and try and assess whether the question of parliamentary accountability in 
CFSP and ESDP has been present on its agenda. 
 
 
III. The question of accountability in foreign/defence policy within the 
Convention debate: no real attention 
 
 
In the Convention11, two working groups have been dealing with foreign and defence matters: a 
working group on the external relations of the EU (Number VII) and one on defence (Number 
VIII). Both working groups issued reports at the end of 2002 and it is therefore possible to 
assess their respective work with regard to the question of democratic accountability. 
Both working groups mention parliamentary scrutiny as one of the issues to be addressed but 
they only deal with it en passant. The Final Report of the Working Group on External Action12 
refers to the fact that consultation of the EP is already possible. It however calls for: 
 
 ´regular exchange of views between the EP and national parliaments on CFSP  issues´. 
 
It also suggests enhancing the EP´s involvement in commercial policy (and refers to the work of 
another Working Group, No. III on Legal Personality [of the Union]), and ´to make the person 
holding the function of HR [High Representative] formally involved in these tasks ´of informing 
the EP13. 
As for the Final Report of the Defence Working Group14, it: 
 
  ´underline[s] the importance of ensuring suitable political scrutiny of security and 
 defence policy, taking account of the specific nature of this field´. 
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Thus, it is interesting to note that some reference is made to the need for accountability but that 
the ´special nature´ of defence policy is also highlighted. The Report goes on to mention that 
there are currently two ways of scrutinizing the ESDP: the EP level and that of national 
parliaments. The Report stresses the right of information that the EP possesses, as well as its 
right to submit resolutions (known as ‘recommendations’) to the Council. As for national 
parliaments, the emphasis is on the constitutional requirement of parliamentary assent to 
military operations abroad. The final point on this issue raised in this report is worth quoting 
fully: 
´regular meetings of the relevant committees of the national parliaments 
should be organised so as to ensure better exchanges of information and 
more effective parliamentary scrutiny. Some members of the Group wanted 
Members of the European Parliament to be associated with these meetings´. 
 
Thus, some form of improved EU-wide, together with national-level, scrutiny would be a positive 
development as it recognises that the ESDP is more than the sum of national defence policies 
(and therefore that the EP should be involved) but that, at the same time, the national 
dimension remains extremely important. This is particularly due to the fact that there is still no 
European demos. 
It is therefore clear from the above that the Convention has not really entered the debate over 
how to deal with the democratic deficits that exist in the CFSP and in the ESDP in any 
substantial manner. There are a number of practical suggestions for improving the current 
democratic deficits in EU  foreign and defence policy that I have presented elsewhere15. I will 
not repeat them here but it is however useful to refer to some additional proposals that have 
been made in different recent WEU Parliamentary Assembly reports16. Some of them come very 
close to some of the ideas presented by the Convention Chair Valéry Giscard d´Estaing17. The 
WEU Assembly proposals mainly refer to the idea of a second EP Chamber which might include 
some of the characteristics of COSAC (specialised parliamentary committees on EU affairs), but 
which will be clearly biased towards the committees on foreign policy and defence matters. The 
WEU parliamentarians see a more constant institution that would combine the advantages of 
the pre-1979 EP (national representation) with those of the post-1979 (and current) EP structure 
(direct elections). On the contrary, Giscard favours a less institutionalised Congress of Peoples. 
In my view, it is clear that a combination of national and European parliamentary accountability 
mechanisms are required because both the CFSP and the ESDP represent more than a 
combination of national policies. Moreover, I think that a dose of democracy would not only be 
welcome for its own sake, but also because it will help create a European consensus. On the 
contrary, an easy option would be to argue that, especially after the recent developments over 
Iraq in early 2003, there is very little need to even debate those issues because there is no 
common European foreign policy, let alone a common defence one. In other words, let us not 
discuss this question until there is a common European foreign and defence policy. This in my 
view represents an easy way out. It does also fail to take into consideration the other side of the 
same coin. Indeed, such an approach ignores the fact that the lack of democracy also hinders 
the emergence of such a policy. Democracy is not a luxury in international affairs. In the case of 
the EU, it is a necessity because the Europeans need to have clear principles, both in terms of 
decision-making and in terms of values projection if all member states are to agree to a given 
policy18. 
 
 
IV. Conclusions 
 
 
It is therefore possible to conclude that very little attention has been paid to the question of 
democratic accountability of the CFSP and the ESDP. It is clear that another missed opportunity 
is being added to the many more that have occurred in the past. Each time there has been a 
treaty revision (or a new treaty), at least ever since the 1986 Single European Act, which 
codified European Political Cooperation (the predecessor to the CFSP19), there has been no 
real interest in the question of democracy and EU foreign policy. Ever since the ´militarization´ 
of the EU (post-Amsterdam) there does not appear to be any interest in how to control 
democratically European defence either. The range of activities that the EU is starting to cover 
in this field is expanding rapidly from the so-called ´Petersberg Tasks´ (rescue, humanitarian 
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and peace-keeping or making operations) to the possibility of a collective security clause in the 
proposed Constitutional Treaty draft that is expected to come out of the Convention debate. 
I have not covered in this paper the problematic question of public opinion. First, there is the 
more general concern about how important public opinion is (or should be) in foreign and 
defence policy. Second, there is little doubt that there is, to use the academic parlance, no 
European-wide demos, especially in foreign and defence matters20. Third, the current 
overwhelming consensus against a war on Iraq should not be seen as clear evidence of the 
emergence (at long last) of such a demos21. The real concerns are numerous: 
 
- why is there such a discrepancy between governments and public opinions in some EU 
states? 
- why is the EP split in half about this issue? 
- how does one address the volatility of public opinions?  
 
In particular, one should not forget that, to use Glucksmann´s own words:  
  
´in a proper democracy, decisions are made not by polling institutes, or at the 
stock  market, or in the streets, but in the voting booth´22. 
 
It is hoped that this paper has highlighted the need for more debate about some vital issues for 
the future of an enlarged and enlarging EU (at the time of writing in late February 2003, Croatia 
had just applied to join the Union). Otherwise, I am afraid we will be talking once more of 
another failed opportunity to democratise the Union. Something, which, it is worth repeating, is a 
sine qua non for the survival of an integration process that is based on a voluntary coming 
together of European democratic states, peoples and nations. 
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